Bosnia’s lesson for Ukraine: a peace deal needs enforcement and guarantees
Bosnia and Herzegovina’s experience shows that ending a war does not ensure safe return, reconstruction or reconciliation. For Ukraine, the authors argue that any settlement must define who will verify compliance and respond to violations.
Bosnia and Herzegovina’s experience shows that signing a peace agreement is only the beginning of a difficult post-war period. For Ukraine, the central issue should be not only the terms of a settlement but also the mechanisms and guarantees that would make it enforceable.
The 1995 Dayton agreement ended the Bosnian war, but its implementation was backed by about 60,000 NATO-led IFOR troops. They separated the armies, oversaw territorial transfers and enforced military provisions.
The authors argue that Ukraine’s own experience has already shown the limits of missions without enforcement powers. The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission, operating from March 2014, could document violations and facilitate dialogue but could not compel compliance. Its mandate ended on 31 March 2022.
Guarantees Russia cannot veto
The Minsk agreements did not end the fighting or prevent Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022. Any future settlement, the authors say, must specify who will verify compliance, respond to renewed attacks and impose consequences on a violator.
Russia is Ukraine’s aggressor and holds a veto on the UN Security Council. A guarantee that Moscow can block would therefore offer limited protection. Ukraine must also retain the ability to defend itself, maintain military capabilities and choose its own security partnerships.
Return requires institutions
The Dayton agreement gave refugees and displaced people the right to return, reclaim property or receive compensation. Laws and administrative procedures were created, while municipalities were monitored and pressured to comply.
Yet return did not end when people received house keys. Some found themselves living as minorities in communities where their social position and security had not been restored. Ukraine’s challenges will be compounded by destroyed homes, mines, unexploded ordnance, mass displacement and the consequences of occupation.
Occupation will leave a wider legacy
After restoring control, Ukraine will have to address pressure to obtain Russian citizenship, property expropriation, the replacement of Ukrainian education, suppression of identity, deportations and forcible transfers of civilians, including children, as well as arbitrary detention.
Bosnia also shows that ending a war and reconciling societies are different processes. Denial of the Srebrenica genocide, historical revisionism and the glorification of convicted war criminals continue, according to the Srebrenica Memorial.
The authors do not propose a Ukrainian copy of Dayton. They urge Ukraine’s partners to plan not only the text of an agreement but also what they will do afterwards: who will remain engaged, provide assistance and respond to violations once global attention shifts to other crises.
What we know
- About 60,000 NATO-led IFOR troops backed the Dayton agreement.
- The OSCE mission in Ukraine had no enforcement powers, and its mandate ended on 31 March 2022.
- Russia’s UN Security Council veto makes guarantees it can block unreliable.
- Post-war return requires laws, administrative procedures and enforcement, not just property rights.
- Bosnia shows that ending a war is not the same as achieving reconciliation.
Trust: Single source
- The story relies on one publisher. A second independent confirmation has not been established from the cited sources.
- Sources: Українська правда.
COMMUNITY
Discussion
Sign in to join the discussion.
Loading comments…